Yesterday I wrote about business and our perception that they owe us. Today's is a bit bigger. I think it's a problem from which we all suffer. I'm aware of it in myself even though I've written about it on more than one occasion. Still, I bring it up because ... well ... I need to remind myself and, I suspect, you, too.
Consider a couple of TV shows. We watch a nature show that depicts wolves in the wild hunting down and killing that poor, cute little snowshoe rabbit. My wife is sad. "He was so cute." I remind her, "That's the way it is." "I know," she says, "but it's still sad." True enough. Then comes the news. This guy is arrested for raping and murdering a little 7-year-old. That mother is in jail for starving her child to death. And we've now shifted from "it's sad" to moral outrage. What's the difference? The difference is that there is a fundamental value shift between a rabbit and a child, between and animal and a human being. Most of us may not like seeing an animal killed -- that's natural -- but we're angry that a person is killed and we will take steps to prevent it from happening again because animals are nice, but people are important.
Now, go to the next story. The news goes on to describe how an earthquake has killed thousands. We see women crying in the rubble and little limp bodies of children killed in the disaster. What is the response to that? For many it is the same moral outrage. "Where was God in all of this?" they demand. "How could He allow such a thing?" What happened there? It is the same moral outrage because the perception is the same. Human beings are important and God ought to see it that way. "God, you owe me." No, no, we would never say that. I don't think we'd even think it. But it's what we mean when we express moral outrage at God for allowing such things.
We (I do mean "we") have a real problem with this. We don't recognize that we are creatures and God is Creator. We see ourselves more on par with God. We are, after all, made in His image, are we not? We're God's representatives, right? We're God's children, for pity sake. Doesn't that make us ... little gods? Oh, now, wait. Perhaps that's too far. And it is.
You see, we have a natural, sinful tendency to worship the creature rather than the Creator. It's an easy mistake. Since we are in the image of God, God has ruled that we don't have the right to damage that image in others. In Gen 9 He made it a matter of the death penalty for murder based on that fact. "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in His own image" (Gen 9:6). So, we naturally think, that restriction must also be on God, too, right? And that's the mistake. Or we think of responsibility. If you make your child responsible for a pet, you expect your child to take good care of that pet. Since God is responsible for us, shouldn't He take good care of us? You see, without actually thinking it out loud, we often and generally believe that God owes us.
The problem is the problem of Theodicy. Why do bad things happen to good people? Where is God in all of that? And we don't recognize the fundamental error. There are no good people. Instead, we are "vessels of wrath prepared for destruction" and the best we can hope for us not merit, but mercy. We suffer from the fundamental sin -- "I will be like the Most High" -- not seeing that this sin disqualifies us from anything good from God. So when He provides it, we aren't grateful and when He provides less than what we expect, we're angry. "You owe me, God." It's a dangerous position to take. You really don't want "fair" from God.
33 comments:
Stan,
Usually when I read through your posts scripture or some quotation from another literary source comes to mind, but today a bit different. I still have passages from the Word being brought to my remembrance, but I also remember a line of dialouge from the Clint Eastwood movie "Unforgiven", I don't know if you've seen it.
Clint Eastwood's character is an older man who was on hard times with a child at home, his wife having died, and went to a town to perform a service for a group of "women of the night", one of which had been cut in the face by a solicitor of their wares that belonged to a local gang. His character was an outlaw in the past and had done horrible atrocities in his past, but had given it up for his wife's sake. The sherriff in town was played by Gene Hackman "Little Bill" who was a nasty lawman that was going to teach the entire town a lesson about what happened when people called out for hired guns. Anyway, the sherriff killed Clint Eastwood's character's compatriot in the endeavor and beat up Clint's character almost to death. After being told of his friends murder, Clint went back to drinking whiskey and came back to town to settle the score with the sherriff. (Sorry for the long lead-up but it's been some time since the movie came out).
Finally, Clint's character has a shoot out in a bar and has killed all the sherriff's men and wounded Little Bill. Clint stood over Little Bill to execute him and Little Bill said "I don't deserve this!" Clint's response was "Deservin's got nothin' to do with it" and summarily dispatched Little Bill.
As you point out so well here, and why this line sticks out in my mind, is that we must understand that in reality "deservin's" got everything to do with it. We are lawbreakers. As C.S. Lewis puts it (paraphrase from Mere Christianity) we're not innocent by-standers but rebels who must lay down our arms. We are not good, we deserve punishment for our sin, God's holiness and purity demands it. In steps Jesus.
I heard a story told by Ravi Zacharias as part of a recent lecture where a man was in the midst of an attack and men all around him were being viciously gunned down. He was the only survivor. He said that the only explanation was that as he was lying motionless amongst the death that surrounded him and the gunmen walked through the area looking for any that survived, he was covered, absolutely covered in another's blood so that he was indistinguishable. That's what Jesus has done for us.
Deservin's got everything to do with it, and there by the grace of God go I.
Yes, to my discredit, I saw and even remember Unforgiven. ("Was this trip really necessary?") And your point is well taken. When I am of clear head and recognize my true condition, I would never dare stand in front of God and demand what I deserve ...
Stan,
I assume that your post here was intended in a more serious vein the one you posted the following day. As you see the bible telling it, the solution to the problem of evil or the problem of suffering is that there's really no problem? The contention that all deserve the worst because of our total depravity forms a familiar theme of Calvinism (which appears to be one of the more coherent forms of Christianity), but it entails contradictions with other biblical claims about the attributes of God. Upon examination, one of the attributes that the creator will lack will be omnipotence, omniscience, or benevolence. The typical approach of most Calvinists to the trilemma is to sacrifice benevolence, generally without even invoking the fig leaf of 'mysterious ways'. Their God is all-powerful and all-knowing, but can hardly be considered good.
It seems from your post that you do not agree with the truism that "might doesn't make right." Suppose that the roles (in terms of power, or creator status) of Satan and God were reversed. In such a world, would Satan be 'right' or 'good'? If so, 'rightness' and 'goodness' are merely functions of who has the greatest power. If not, then so evaporates the legitimacy of an appeal to power to justify 'rightness'.
Perhaps you weren't trying to justify what you assume to be the actions of your God, and were just saying "that's the way things are". In which case I have to agree with you, but surely if that's the response to 'the bad' should it not also be the response to 'the good'? If you say, as does Jeremy, that "there by the grace of God go I", then the obvious corollary is that "there by the grace of God goes someone else." I would not suggest that you are happy about anyone's suffering, but clearly (particularly in a Calvinistic worldview, if yours is such) if there is an all-powerful, all-knowing God then He is quite happy with such suffering - suffering beyond all decent contemplation. Ask yourself, is this world the best such a God could do? At this point I think even the Calvinists avail themselves of an appeal to 'mysterious ways', they do believe in heaven after all...
Cobalt,
I have to admit that I've never quite understood the dilemma (trilemma) you're offering. I know it's a standard one, but it doesn't seem so to me.
The premise appears to be that God is supposed to be like us. That is, He ought to conform to the same rules we do. And for the life of me I cannot figure out why.
Let me try a purely human example. I see ... oh, I don't know ... say, a tagger spray-painting a wall. I know it's illegal, so I go over, restrain him, take him home, and lock him in my basement. Good, right? Well, of course not. It is not my prerogative to incarcerate individuals. However, if such a fellow came before a judge, the judge would be perfectly within his rights to do so. We understand, then, that certain people have certain rights and responsibilities that others don't.
Why, then, would this God -- the Creator of the Universe ... you know, the Owner -- be limited to only the things that we do? We aren't allowed, for instance, to kill, but why would that necessarily carry over to Him? We are allowed to kill ... ants. We might even annihilate an entire community of ants without batting an eye because ants are ants and we are not. Yet it seems as if we're requiring God to conform to our standards, calling out the Creator and demanding of Him, "Why aren't you more like us??!!" I don't see how that's even reasonable.
I used an illustration some time ago. Maybe it will help. You go to an art gallery for a showing of a particular artist. You're enjoying the art when someone comes in off the street and takes a knife to one of the pictures. The proprietor stops him, calls the police, and he's hauled off in handcuffs for the act. A little while later another person comes in off the street. He pulls out a knife and slashes another piece, rips it off the wall, and breaks it up. He leaves undisturbed. You ask the proprietor, "Hey, why didn't you call the police on that guy?" "Because," he answers, "that was the artist. He can do with his creations as he pleases." We get it on that level. Why is God so different?
Is this world the best such a God could do? I suppose it depends on what you think such a God was trying to accomplish. If He was trying to accomplish a comfortable, happy place for the things He made, I'd say, "No, He really messed up." But if He was trying to accomplish something different, something not tied up in the happiness of His creation, then I'd argue that it's entirely possible that this is the best such a God could do. But we humans don't like that answer. You see, God owes us ... oh, wait, that's what the post was about, wasn't it? :)
Hello again Stan,
The contention isn't that God of the bible isn't powerful enough to do as he pleases; it's that what he pleases isn't necessarily good merely on account of his ability. Such was the point in posing the counter-factual (at least to your mind, I assume) of the role of Satan and God being reversed. If Satan were more powerful than God, would you thus consider him to be good? I would guess not, but than again perhaps you would. Such is trouble with a "might makes right" ethic.
Let's turn to one of your analogies. You say that an artist has the authority to do what he pleases with his creations, but the tale leaves off the attribute of critical importance. Paintings lack the ability to suffer, sentient beings do not. If the 'painting' was alive and aware and suffered horribly when and if the painter destroys it, would the same situation hold? Hardly. Again, I point you toward the hypothetically swapped Satan/God situation. Suppose that Satan created humans instead of God. If Satan then tortured his creations in capricious ways, sending all manner of torments upon them, how would such a world be distinguishable from our own?
Considering the situation described above, would Satan rightly be considered evil for his treatment of us? A view that the creator has the absolute right to do whatever he wills with his creations would have you saying "no". And that’s the absurdity of 'might makes right'. You would consider a human who created sentient life and then tortured it to be engaging in evil, yes? Such has nothing to do with the status of the creator, and everything to do with the creation's ability to suffer.
Let's turn to a different (and perhaps larger) point that you aim for in your responding post. You say that "it seems as if we're requiring God to conform to our standards". But of course, what other standards can we use? What standards do you use to determine if a voice speaking in your head (let's say commanding you kill your child) is that of your God or that of the devil? Not by what it tells you to do, it would seem. For example: what is it that you can point to that separates the case of Abraham from that of Andrea Yates or Joseph Hagerman? Little other than that, in the story, God stopped Abraham before he could carry out the nefarious deed. In fact, a belief system such as the one you espouse here doesn't see the Abrahamic deed as nefarious at all (and it says no approbation of the issue as it concerns Jephthah and his daughter). Neither does it have any qualms about the genocides as recorded in Joshua 6 and 10. No problems with the sorry tale of Job either. It can encompass any act, no matter how terrible - as if power and goodness were not equivalent. 'Is-ought', and all that... which is kind of what my post was about. ;)
Too much to say. This will be in two entries.
There is something I realized I needed to point out that I missed before. My readers are generally Christians, people with the same basic theistic beliefs that I have. Most of what I write, then, is aimed at tuning those views rather than convincing skeptics. You asked, then, about a post not aimed at defending the goodness of God, and you asked how I defend the goodness of God. So understand that my post and your questions are at cross purposes. Just for clarification. However, I understand at this point that we're no longer discussing my post, but your objections to my view.
You contended before that God is not "benevolent". You appear to use the word "good" as a synonym. To me, these are not the same. Benevolence is the inclination to be nice, while "good" is, well, a somewhat different concept. And I would agree that God is not omni-benevolent. I don't know where such a claim would come from. There is no such claim in the Bible. Again, just for clarification.
(to be continued)
(continuing on, then ...)
You use certain concepts in what you've written that change the face of the conversation. You point out, for instance, that my example of the artist doesn't take into account that paintings don't feel pain. You ignored, however, my similar illustration that humans have no compunction to avoid killing ants (who do suffer). The reasoning behind the artist and his pictures and humans and the ants is the same: We are not the same kinds of beings. I guess you didn't quite catch that (because in all likelihood I didn't get it across in a satisfactory manner).
The other concept you used without batting an eye was in your question about Satan rather than God being the Creator. "If Satan then tortured his creations in capricious ways, sending all manner of torments upon them, how would such a world be distinguishable from our own?" Like the false dilemma, "Mr. Smith, answer yes or no; have you stopped beating your wife?", you've made it impossible for me to answer your question in a meaningful way. In your fictitious version, if Satan tortured his creations in capricious ways, it would be a bad thing. We don't hold and the Bible doesn't suggest that God does any such thing. The biblical description of Natural Man is "vessels of wrath". We are "dead in sin", hostile to God, intent only on evil. This removes the capricious accusation. Even the "commanding you kill your child" problem misses the reality of Abraham's situation. According to the Bible, Abraham would have considered it capricious and nefarious if he didn't have a particular belief: "He considered that God was able even to raise him from the dead." The Bible says it wasn't capricious; it was a test of faith. The Bible says that Abraham knew it wouldn't be the end of the story because he had a solid promise from God that the son he was being asked to kill was the son of promise. Unlike your Andrea Yates or Joseph Hagerman, Abraham had direct, face-to-face confirmation from God that 1) God had made him certain (as in "sure") promises, and 2) Isaac would live on to be the father of a great nation. I don't remember anyone else getting that same face-to-face promise.
The problem, however, boils down to a simple difference of viewpoints. One side will claim that humans are basically good and deserve to be treated well. The other side will claim that humans are in basic revolt against God and God has the right to treat them as enemies. If one holds that God has no such right and that humans deserve to be treated well from God, then when God does otherwise He is capricious and evil. I get that. I just disagree on the premise.
Oh, and I see that I still haven't addressed the Satan/God switch question. I don't see God as good because He is the Creator. I see God as good because He is God. Good is defined by His nature, not by His might. I simply don't see Him as capriciously tormenting His creation like you do. So the whole Satan/God switch question doesn't work for me because Satan isn't good by definition and God isn't good by means of being the one in power.
(Why you would suggest that the story of Jephthah and his daughter is touted as a good thing I don't know. Giving an historical account of an event doesn't mean that what he did was good or right.)
Stan,
I'll follow your lead in breaking up my response into two posts.
Your post aimed at dismissing the need to defend the goodness of God. My post was intended to point out that without adequately answering the problem of suffering, you're putting the cart in front of the horse. The end-run doesn't seem to work because the problem doesn't actually get answered. The story of Job is a case study of this issue.
To be sure, words can have multiple meanings, but benevolence and goodness are synonyms. In my experience, Godly benevolence in the context of the problem of evil is typically meant as something like 'perfect goodness' or 'moral perfection'. If you don't care for the usage of benevolent thusly, we can use a different word or phrase; my point remains the same.
The ant analogy also misses some key, but different, points. Humans didn't create ants; we are not responsible for their existence. We didn't bring them into existence with the intention of then causing them immense suffering. There is, in general, no implicit responsibility we have toward them. Though specific exceptions can be found; if we keep them as pets, breed them, etc. then we in fact do start to have a responsibility toward their welfare. But setting that aside, we would expect the goodness of God to be greater than our own. (And if your response here is that we, being totally depraved, have no goodness, then we can come back and address that later.) We consider it compassionate and good not to cause gratuitous suffering. If we can be concerned about the suffering of an ant (and there are humans who are), how much more can God be concerned about the suffering of us? The principle point of the question isn't to suggest that in your theology we are, relatively speaking, closer to God than ants are to us. It is instead that God's capacity for compassion and goodness is expected to be, relatively speaking, vastly (infinitely?) greater than our own. A world with suffering, such as the one we reside in, doesn't appear to be a world with a good (even by our standards, let alone superior ones), all-powerful, and all-knowing God in control of it.
...continued
On to the capriciousness of suffering. You claim that the bible doesn't have God causing suffering capriciously. The book of Job (and Ecclesiastes, by the way) contradicts that view. God himself cites Job as being blameless; He did not view him as a 'vessel of wrath', and throughout the prolog Job is specifically said to not have sinned. And yet God causes the immense suffering of Job for what? To win a bet. With one of his own angels. Such action comports with the meaning of the word capricious. And the word fickle.
I would disagree that one side would say that humans are basically good, if this is to mean my side. I don't think that humans are basically good; if anything, we're basically neutral. But we are certainly capable of both good and evil.
I'm glad that you're now backing away from the view that a creator has the right to do what ever he wills with his creations. At least that much insight has been gained from the Satan/God hypothetical. But I'm afraid that the view that God is good because he's God is special pleading of the most obvious sort. Let's circle back to a different version of the Satan/God hypothetical; in this case let's swap their putative goodness and evilness, leaving titles and powers the same. On what grounds could you to still say that God is good because he's God? As it seems that you've already agreed, you wouldn't have such grounds in that situation (as you agree it's not God's power that makes him good). You would have to appeal to your own sense of good and evil to work it out. Since, at root, one's own morality must be used to evaluate if something is good or evil, there's no easy escape from the problem of suffering by saying that God is "good by definition", when it is exactly that which is called into question by one's moral standards.
Oh, man, too many characters again. Sigh ...
As is to be expected in conversations from two radically divergent perspectives, this is getting quite sticky. There are points made that need to be addressed and then there are points made aimed at addressing previous points that are clearly misunderstandings. At some point the pile of points becomes pointless. (Playing on words.)
"Your post aimed at dismissing the need to defend the goodness of God."
I think nothing of the sort. I don't know where you got that idea. I dismiss the need to defend the idea that God ought to be nice to everyone, but I don't know where you got this idea. Or how about this one?
"I'm glad that you're now backing away from the view that a creator has the right to do what ever he wills with his creations."
If you got that from something I said, then we are truly two people separated by a common language. I wouldn't back away from it. I demand it. The Creator has the right to do whatever He wills with His creation and, for the life of me, I can't imagine what the objection to that really is.
"The ant analogy also misses some key, but different, points."
Tell ya what ... when you can come up with an analogy for a pseudo-gonculator, a device found in space that has no correlation to anything we've ever seen, you let me know. Yeah, I know, off the mark. The point is that no analogy is perfect. Factor in the holiness of God ("holiness" in biblical terms is actually "other", and God, in the Bible, is regarded as radically "other"), and trying to offer analogies that fit perfectly becomes an impossible task. I've wondered at times if I should cease using analogies and illustrations because once I lay them out there people seize on them, point out where they don't fit, and miss the point entirely that I was trying to explain. You know, like this time.
To be continued ...
Now, as to the points that need to be addressed, I'm also at a loss.
"Let's circle back to a different version of the Satan/God hypothetical; in this case let's swap their putative goodness and evilness, leaving titles and powers the same."
I'm afraid you lost me entirely there. Huh?
When I said that it is not God's power that makes Him good, I was referencing the "might makes right" position. God is good because His nature is good. That is, good is defined by His nature. The suggestion that most make (and I think you're making as well) is that there is some "good" to which even a god must conform to be considered "good". More accurately, that god must conform according to my understanding to "good". If that being doesn't conform to that standard, it's not a good being.
My problem is that God appears to conform to that which I consider good anyway. You don't think it was right for Him to tell Abraham to kill his son (even though the event never occurred) and I think the entire thing was good. You think it was wrong for God to order His people to kill the people of a particular group and I can see that it was good. (I would strongly disagree with anyone who would make the same suggestion today -- "God told me to kill an entire race" -- but that's a different discussion and one I won't be doing here.)
You and I are coming from radically different originations, so we come to radically different conclusions. You, for instance, understand Job to be "blameless" in some sense of "sinless" apparently, and I see the entire story as a proving ground and repair effort on a man that needed it. You call it capricious and I call it necessary surgery. I start with God as a starting point and factor down and you start with Man as a starting point and factor up. I see God as being good by the standards that I believe to define good. I think that humans as a whole deserve judgment from God and anything nice that He does is ... in Christian terms, "grace" -- unmerited favor. If He chose to annihilate the entire human race it would appear to me to be just and to you to be cruel.
At great peril I have to ask a question from another illustration. As a young man I started raising rabbits. Sometimes I had to kill them because there were problems. Most of the time I provided what they needed. When I was done raising the rabbits, I killed them all (well, I sold them to be killed). Since they were my responsibility, since they didn't live perfectly comfortable lives, and since the outcome was that all died, would you say that this was an evil thing to do?
Isn't this funny? I replied to Cobalt and then went out to read some of the blogs I follow and came across this one that seems to say exactly what I'm trying to say.
Oh, I missed an important point that occurred to me when I was reading your comments and then didn't make it to what I responded. The suggestion you are making is that if the God of the Bible exists, He either enjoys the suffering of His creatures or He doesn't care. I need to point out that the Bible (remember, we're talking about "the God of the Bible") specifically denies this (e.g., Ezek 33:11).
And another question. Is the world really as horrible a place as you seem to be painting it, or are you, perhaps, overstating your view of how horrible it really is? Seems to me that most people are happy folk, but to hear your version the standard fare of human existence is misery. Is it?
Stan,
I'll make one more pass at seeing if we can't find some common ground (seeing as you seem to think that is unlikely, perhaps I'll then excuse myself from your blog space).
In the context of our conversation, on what grounds does a creator have the right to do whatever he pleases with his creations? It can't be merely the creator status that gives such a right, as that obviously devolves into "might makes right". Being a creator is not sufficient to make a God good, as you already seem to agree when you say, "I don't see God as good because He is the Creator." Thus, it is not necessarily the case that a creator has the right to do whatever he wills with a creation. A 'right' is a just claim or title, whether legal, prescriptive, or moral. My focus here is obviously on the moral, thus if the creator need not be good on account of simply being the creator, then there is no assurance that the creator has the (moral) right to do whatever he wills with a creation. Is that clear enough?
Yet you demand that God has such a right. One can't legitimately appeal to God's power or creator status to justify such a right, so you appeal to God as the ultimate moral standard. But that is begging the question as it concerns the problem of suffering. The moral rectitude of God is precisely what needs to be established.
The apparent foundering of what could be taken as your approach to theodicy aside, let's question a bit deeper on tangential issues. How does one morally evaluate the claim that God is the ultimate moral standard in a way that isn't viciously circular? If "exactly what you're trying to say" is something like the content of the blog you linked to, then I must say I'm a bit disappointed. I feel from our few exchanges that you're capable of surpassing that sort of screed.
As to your question of rabbits the short answer (as an analogy to God) is yes, the suffering you may have caused was unnecessary and thus immoral. Why unnecessary? Well imagine that you are all-powerful and all-knowing, badda-bing, suddenly nothing that caused the rabbits suffering need actually obtain. Why immoral? Because it was unnecessary. That is...unless you now want to suggest that the suffering of the rabbits was in fact necessary in some mysterious way?
In terms of the merely non-omnipotent, non-omniscient young lagomorpologist, the answer to your query revolves around the net effect on the rabbits of those things under your control, and is quite possibly no. Obviously, not everything that may have caused the rabbits to suffer could have been within your control, or even understanding.
It looks like we're dealing here with a lot of etymological ambiguity. When you say, for instance, "might makes right", I think of the position that holds that because someone has power it necessarily defines them as correct. I've denied that. What I have affirmed is that because He is the Creator, He has the right to do as He wills with His creation. His title gives Him that right. That statement doesn't deal at all with whether or not He is good. That is the second part of the sentence. I can't imagine what would prevent a Creator from having the right to do as He wills with His creation. The question of whether or not He is good would be rooted in what He wills, not in the right to do what He wills. That's the other part of what I affirm. His nature is, by definition, good. Since all beings operate within the confines of their own nature, God would will only what is good.
Of course, now we run into the problem, don't we? You contend that what you see in terms of human suffering makes God evil. Let's see if we can't clarify that a little. First, there is no room in your worldview for human suffering to be defined as "good" by any means. It's a pretty simple equation, so to speak. "If pleasant to humans, then good. If not pleasant, then bad." Or, in my bunny tale terms, killing off all the rabbits was bad to the rabbits, but I was raising them to make money, so it was good to me. In no sense, however, could it be considered "good" because it was bad for the rabbits. To be clear and to be fair and to be straightforward, the accusation must be stated this way: "In terms of 'good' as I define it and understand it, God cannot be considered good because He does not conform to my terms." Fair enough?
Here is the standard demand: "How does one morally evaluate the claim that God is the ultimate moral standard in a way that isn't viciously circular?" Frankly, isn't this exactly the approach on the question of origins? We claim "Every cause requires an effect. God has always been and He is the first cause." "Oh? Then where did God come from?" That is, there isn't a problem, not a bat of an eye in believing that a singularity brought all that is into existence in science, but suggest the singularity of God and it's circular. The claim is that God is a singularity, a one-of-a-kind being who by definition, caused everything that is and is, by definition, good. If an external set of moral values are binding to this singularity, then it requires that there is something higher than this being ... another singularity. Yet, without this new thing, I am charged with being circular in my reasoning.
I hold that God meets His own definition of good. I hold that our definition of good comes originally from His character. In all cases that I've seen, objections to His goodness have always been raised from the perspective that He doesn't meet the standard of good from "my" perspective (where "my" refers to whoever is raising the objection). And as far as I can see the standard objection starts with the vast importance of Man and minimizes the Creator. In other word, the perception is that He does owe us.
What I'm a little curious about is the source of the standard you would use with which to judge God (you know, in the absence of God). What is it about your standard and its source that makes it applicable to God ... or to any other being for that matter? What gives this standard any authority at all? I'm not suggesting no moral standard; I'm simply questioning its source and, as such, its authority.
Stan,
Firstly I'd like to briefly say that there are number of assertions and tangents both in your most recent reply, and in previous ones, that I haven't been addressing for the sake of staying focused on the central issue. For instance, the proper understanding of Job as intended by the authors (are you aware that there were at least two?). But I will take a moment to say that there is rather little ambiguity about the etymology of "might makes right"; it is "Vae victis." There is some ambiguity, though, if 'etymology' is the word you really wanted to use here. Etymology, you see, deals with the origins and history of words (or phrases) and how their forms, meanings, and usages have evolved over time. The origin of the phrase appears to be ancient Greece; and it finds its way into works of Homer and Hesiod around 800 BCE. The basic idea of the phrase is rejected by Socrates, as told by Plato in The Republic, some 400 years later, from which point its meaning has remained virtually unchanged.
Resuming attention on my focus - As I said on Friday; if the creator need not be good on account of simply being the creator, then there is no assurance that the creator has the moral right to do whatever he wills with a creation. In your response, I don't see anything that clearly attempts to engage that issue. Do you see a difference between moral and legal rights? Moral rights are considered universal, legal rights are relative. In 'legal' terms, a creator could have the rights in question because of the relation between created and creator (and goodness or evilness doesn't come under consideration). In 'moral' terms, the relation between creator and created has no bearing on the rights of either (and here goodness or evilness specifically can and does come under consideration). Ya dig?
continued below...
continuing...
You again say that God is good, by definition, continuing to beg the question. The problem of suffering calls that assumption into question. Obviously, if one wishes to actually answer the problem of suffering, merely restating a starting assumption will not suffice.
You then equate a question of moral evaluations to scientifically and philosophically valid explanations about causation. This is one of those issues that appears highly tangential and will tend to detract from the issue at hand, so I'll just mention a few salient features of 'first causes'. The primary reason to object, scientifically, to God-as-first-cause is because God is not simple. In terms of explanatory power, the typical approach of the theist is, scientifically speaking, exactly backwards: the 'explanation' is more fantastic – and more in need of explaining - than is the thing to be explained. With biology, for example, compare the bottom-up explanation of evolution to the top-down explanation of intelligent design. The former gives explanations of complex things in terms of progressively more simple things. The latter gives explanations of complex things with yet more complex things. In terms of explanatory power and parsimony, the former works and the latter doesn't.
Your next paragraph attempts to call into question the relevance of human moral standards in the face of those purportedly belonging to God. If our moral sense is to be trusted, then the problem of suffering is fully in force. If our moral sense is not to be trusted, then we are in no position to judge if God's (or anyone's) morals are in fact good. This latter way possibility leads to self-referential incoherence.
I suppose, if we were so inclined, we could dance this dance for a long time. I'm nearly certain, however, that it would get nowhere. I've already told you that the morality of God makes sense to me, but you've dismissed that as, what, circular? I've explained that God defines good and you've dismissed that as begging the question. I've asked you what source you use to determine that such a God would not be good and the only answer I can find, as far as I can tell, is "incoherence".
So let's try this from a completely different direction. Since the approach is to dismiss all my answers, how about if you provide some? You asked "Is this world the best such a God could do?" The question is obviously supposed to be answered in the negative. So tell me, what would a better world look like? And I'm still wondering about the source of the standards by which you decide if God is moral or not. These might be helpful bits of information to continue the discussion because so far I've been providing answers (that you dismiss) and doing so in the dark, not knowing your intent or premises.
Stan,
You write, "I've asked you what source you use to determine that such a God would not be good and the only answer I can find, as far as I can tell, is "incoherence"." Well, I apologize if that is the impression that you've received. What I've said was self-referentially incoherent is a view that our morals are not to be trusted. The source used to determine that such a God (an otherwise omnipotent and omniscient one) is not good is suffering.
You ask, "So tell me, what would a better world look like?" I've already hinted at the form an answer might be expected to take. You do believe in heaven, don't you? Do you expect that there will be suffering in heaven?
Do you agree that there is gratuitous, non-redemptive suffering in the world? Suffering that does no one any good? Suppose a malarial infant orphan (whose brief life experienced only misery, and whose mother experienced no joy from her pregnancy) dies in great pain and anguish somewhere in Africa unnoticed and un-mourned by any living person. Who or what has benefitted from this short, misery-filled, little existence? The vultures? Would you see the full belly of a vulture as 'morally' worth the suffering that in this case leads up to it? What sort of 'balancing' benefit can be appended to such suffering that isn't transparently ad hoc?
Given that we seem to be talking about an omnipotent and omniscient concept of God, there is nothing other than the desires of the creator that need stand in the way of the best possible world. Since a world perfect in every sense is fully possible, then the best possible would is an absolutely perfect one. A world that contains any imperfection is not the best possible world. The world we find ourselves in is not free from imperfection (such as gratuitous, non-redemptive suffering) thus it is not the best possible world.
Again, given that we're talking about an omniscient and omnipotent creator, there is no goal or desire that can't be obtained via the best possible world except the 'goal' of an inferior world. If an omnipotent and omniscient God created a world such as our own, such was its intent.
Your other concern is that you're "still wondering about the source of the standards by which you decide if God is moral or not." Here I've done more than hint at the answer. The source of the standards by which one decides thusly is one's own morals. They necessarily belong to whoever is doing the deciding after all...
Ask yourself again, by what standard you would decide on issues of morality if a still, quiet voice in your head told you to do something? Assuming you recognized the voice as not being your own (as belonging to God, the Devil, or some other sort of critter (or, hey, even assuming that it is your own desire)) your own morality must kick in to alert you that there is a moral decision to be made here. How are you to make a moral decision if you aren't aware there is moral decision to be made?
"You do believe in heaven, don't you? Do you expect that there will be suffering in heaven?"
Of course I believe in heaven, but I believe heaven will be a radically different place than this with fundamentally different conditions and a fundamentally different purpose.
"Do you agree that there is gratuitous, non-redemptive suffering in the world? Suffering that does no one any good?"
We're into that area again of differences of terminology. I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "gratuitous, non-redemptive suffering". It seems as if you're asking me if we live in a world where suffering occurs for no good reason whatsoever. I would say, "No". But your method of determining that seems to be 1) solely from the direction of the creature (humans) and 2) whether or not you can offer a viable explanation. That is, if there is a God and He intentionally allows (or even causes) human suffering, it's wrong. The only way that it could possibly be right is if He provided you a specific, allowable answer for it that you would consider acceptable. But I know of people who ask the same question in reverse. "Don't we live in a world where there is gratuitous, non-redemptive privilege? Why should some people be more comfortable than others? That's not right!" In other words, it seems as if the requirement here is two-fold. God, if He is to be considered moral, must provide the ultimate comfort to His creation and must answer to His creation for what He chooses to do. God's goals must be the "best possible world" for the creature.
I would argue that the Creator is entitled to do with His creation as He pleases and isn't obligated to answer to His creation for it. (I think "entitled" is a better word in this case than the more confusing term "right".) I would further argue that His creation isn't deserving of the favor you seem to be demanding. We aren't poor little lambs who have lost our way. We are an army of felons intent on overthrowing His control. In my set of values, if God were to terminate all humans tomorrow, He would be just in doing so. You're outraged that there is any suffering at all, and I'm amazed that anyone still enjoys any benefits at all.
As to your source (which you addressed twice here), my point would exactly be that your particular set of values cannot be trusted and are, therefore, self-referentially incoherent. (I understood what you said and that was what I was intending to point out.) You say that your source is your own morals. That's the only possible source in the absence of God, but in what possible sense can you say, "My moral perspectives are binding on you (or God or anyone else at all)"? Your moral values are yours. Lacking anyone with genuine authority to demand any particular morals from anyone, why wouldn't Ted Bundy's sense of morals be just as valid as yours? That is, in what sense could you say, "Ted Bundy committed moral atrocities" when it is merely your own sense of morality that is used to judge and cannot be held as binding on him?
The problem, however, in my view is the starting point of the question. Is this the best possible world that an omnipotent, omniscient God could make? Wouldn't that depend on the reason such a being would have for making such a world and whether or not such a being was entitled to do what He wished for His own good reasons? Wouldn't that depend on whether or not such a God was obligated to the things He makes? And isn't that the original intent of my post here? I hold that God owes humans nothing. You seem to argue that God owes us everything. It seems as if we're starting from fundamentally different positions on both God and humans.
In terms of possible world semantics, there is only one world that actually obtains. Thus if heaven exists, it is part of this world.
You say, "As to your source (which you addressed twice here), my point would exactly be that your particular set of values cannot be trusted and are, therefore, self-referentially incoherent." Self-defeating nonsense. You can't even begin to assess if your values aren't to be trusted morally without using those same values to administer the assessment. Nor can you (with an eye toward bootstrapping your way to an independent standard) assess some other prospective set of values (lets say God's) without appealing to your own in the process. Thus if you then appeal to God's values, you're still, at root, relying on your own. It's pretty amusing that you claim to have understood my view, when you so clearly do not.
You also say, "We are an army of felons intent on overthrowing His control." Even assuming the Calvinistic fairytale, ask yourself, need such have been the case? You seem not to grasp, even superficially, the reach of omnipotence.
You ask, "in what possible sense can you say, "My moral perspectives are binding on you (or God or anyone else at all)"?" At the very least, in the sense that morals need not be arbitrary. Either there is objective morality or there isn't. If so, then end of story. If not, then there's only subjective morality. Your preferred view appeals to subjective morality by definition. It is that of whatever happens to be the whim of the creator. Subjective morality with a cannon, but subjective nonetheless. To meet the criteria of being objective, moral truths must be mind-independent. The effects of actions that we see as being morally relevant are such that our views reflect deeper, mind-independent, truths about reality. This is precisely why we can usefully study morality in terms of evolutionary psychology.
Finally you say, "Wouldn't [the question of if this is the best possible world] depend on the reason such a being would have for making such a world and whether or not such a being was entitled to do what He wished for His own good reasons?" The only way suffering is necessary with an omnipotent and omniscient creator is if he specifically wants to cause it. Again, assuming there were 'good reasons' is merely begging the question against the problem of suffering.
Well, as it seems to be inevitable in these cases, we're probably about done here. Since my view can only be characterized as a "fairytale" and my views are "amusing", it's pretty clear we are not two intelligent people having an intelligent exchange about differing viewpoints. I don't believe I have characterized your view in a disparaging way. I've no big problem with this kind of approach -- I mean, I'm not offended -- but when we get here, we've run out of conversation, haven't we?
You start with you as the ultimate source. I start with God. You find God evil because He doesn't meet your criteria. In my experience I've either been able to see how God was right (morally correct) in what He has done or I have assumed that I lack sufficient information to make a call and refer back to Rule #1 (God is right). You see God as obligated to His creation and I see the Creator as above that. You consider "the Calvinistic fairytale" regarding Man's sinfulness as unnecessary and I see it as mandatory. But that's because you believe that the ultimate purpose of God's creation must be the welfare of God's creation and I see God's creation as a means to His own ends that may or may not be always pleasant for the creation. As an example, in a "perfect world" where Man has no sin (and, therefore, no freedom to choose anything other than "not sin"), there is no sense in which qualities such as grace, mercy, even justice could be understood. I know. Not good enough.
By the way, perhaps I define "omnipotence" differently. I do not define it as irrational omnipotence -- God can do anything at all. That would require that God could both be and not be, that He could start an unstoppable force toward an unmovable barrier, that He could make circular squares, that He could be untrustworthy and faithful, that He could make a rock too big for Him to pick up, and so on. I, like Aquinas, define omnipotence as the power to do all things that can possibly be done.
I've been fine with the discussion thus far. Clearly your disdain for my reasoning and perspectives is starting to show through. Since we have such radically different starting points, since my starting point of God shapes my reasoning after that, since you're fairly sure it is a ludicrous way to think, and since I'm quite convinced of my view, I don't know if there is much value in continuing the discussion. Besides, when we start ridiculing the other perspective, we really are at the end, aren't we? Well, seems so to me, at least. Since any appeal to God, His nature, or the like is always "begging the question" or "circular" or incoherent, I guess you can walk away knowing you've "proven" your point, right? I mean, at least you must admit we've come to the end of rational objections. But thanks for the pleasant conversation while it lasted.
Stan,
My apologies that my last reply seemed unfriendly or rude. Such was not my intent, sorry.
Regarding your response, the point of the bit about the necessity of using one's own morals is that one can't "start with God" in terms of morality. Do you not agree that you necessarily appeal to your own morality when deciding if God's morality is in fact good?
Why do you see sin as being mandatory? Could God not have created a world with both freedom (if such is of a premium in the BPW) and sinlessness? In other words, what logical contradiction is there in freedom and sinlessness both obtaining? If God is both free and sinless, why might he be unable to make more beings after such a fashion? Likewise, what do you see as the logical contradiction in grace, mercy, or justice having meaning (or appreciation) of in a sinless world? For instance, supposing that God had never created anything, is it really your contention that God would be unable to understand or appreciate the idea of justice?
Beyond that, do you think that it is necessary (for the BPW to obtain) that the 'road to salvation' be narrow? Would the world be worse if, all else being equal, it had let's say 5 fewer unregenerate humans? Alternatively, would it be a better world if, all else being equal, it had 5 more souls go to an eternity of punishment? What if all those not of the elect, had simply never existed, would the elect necessarily appreciate their unworthy status any less?
All appeals to God's nature are not necessarily a form of begging the question; that depends entirely upon what the question.
"... the point of the bit about the necessity of using one's own morals is that one can't "start with God" in terms of morality."
If I believe that God is the start of morality, then why am I required to start with my own morals to measure God's morality? Wouldn't I be required, rather, to examine my moral values to see if they line up with His? Of course, my starting point -- my initial value -- is "God is the start of morality", so in that sense I am starting from my own sense of values.
"Why do you see sin as being mandatory? Could God not have created a world with both freedom (if such is of a premium in the BPW) and sinlessness?"
But ... He did create a world where freedom and sinlessness existed. However, Man chose sin.
"What do you see as the logical contradiction in grace, mercy, or justice having meaning (or appreciation) of in a sinless world?"
We only know things from 1) comparison and 2) contrast. I can tell you, "There is a kind of tree in my yard that looks a lot like a banana tree" and you'll have an idea of what I'm explaining. If I tell you, "It's a lot like a blimpet tree", you'd be lost. (Yeah, yeah, I made up "blimpet". But you get the point ... right?) If we don't know what bad is, we don't know what good is. If we don't know what judgment is, we don't know what justice is.
Your question on the "narrow road" falls into the category of "I don't know." I don't have sufficient knowledge to answer the question. In areas in which my knowledge falls short (which, I think we would all have to admit is way too often), I defer to "I know that God is good."
But the questions are still coming from the same starting point. God owes His creation. He is obligated to provide "the best possible world" that is defined as "the most comfortable world for humans". If I argued "God needed to obliterate the dinosaurs to make a point", we'd have less objection. They're dinosaurs, not humans. But the premise is always, "God is obligated to humans." It's a fundamental basis upon which we disagree.
"But ... He did create a world where freedom and sinlessness existed. However, Man chose sin."
Omniscience comes to the fore. An all-knowing God (at least in the typical Calvinistic view) has perfect foreknowledge. Man choosing sin in the world that was instantiated would not have come as a surprise. If God had tweaked the initial conditions a bit this way, or a bit that way, would Man still necessarily have chose sin? The question of why it would be impossible for God to create sinless and free beings remains.
"If we don't know what judgment is, we don't know what justice is."
I was trying to start with smaller bites on this one. I asked if it was possible for God, without creating anything, to know what justice is. Surely you would agree that God could know this (even without judging or being judged), yes?
The next small bite: what prevents God from creating other beings capable of knowing the same thing (also without judging or being judged)?
" Your question on the "narrow road" falls into the category of "I don't know." I don't have sufficient knowledge to answer the question. In areas in which my knowledge falls short (which, I think we would all have to admit is way too often), I defer to "I know that God is good.""
I understand that you don't have an answer ready, but do you see why many people justifiably see the situation, as described by reformed Christianity, as being highly problematic in this regard? Does the idea of an omnipotent and omniscient God intentionally creating throw-away people (I believe the phrase was 'vessels of wrath') honestly strike you as the best way to do things? Imagine you are an omnipotent and omniscient being poised to do some creating: are throw-away sentient beings a must-have for some reason?
"Omniscience comes to the fore."
Of course, since I believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, and, most importantly, sovereign God, I believe that God knew that sin would result and intended for it to happen. But here's what you're asking. You are asking why God couldn't make another being who knew what He knows and operated as He operates and understood as He understands. Why, after all, couldn't God make, well, other gods? That, you're quite sure, would have been the best of all possible worlds.
Again, the premise is that God owes us. Suffering is wrong. It is wrong for humans to have to be uncomfortable. If God is going to be considered good, then nothing uncomfortable can ever happen.
Interestingly, I heard just a few weeks ago on an old radio show that very premise. It was one of those old radio plays. The main character wanted to go to "paradise", a "better place" he imagined where evil was gone and strife was over and everything was peaceful. In this non-Christian story, the character gets his wish. He goes where there is no strife, no competition, no evil. He wishes for company and has a beautiful woman for company. He wants to eat and finds food at his fingertips. They take him deer hunting and the deer line up to be shot. And he finds that this "paradise" is intolerable. He needs the strife, the competition, the difficulties in life. Not my idea; the writers of this particular show. But you're quite sure that 1) there is a theoretical better world where 2) humans don't suffer at all and 3) God would operate at the whim of the creation.
Here's the interesting thing in all of this. I posit that the world as we know it is the world God intended it to be. He didn't do it for humans. The human has an inflated ego that makes it "all about us", but it's not. Humans, instead, have earned death and God has shown grace and mercy in holding it off and even saving some entirely. That seems more than fair to me. So here's what it boils down to. You think that since this God doesn't meet your criteria of "good", it serves as some sort of proof that He doesn't exist. The fact that He meets my criteria of "good" doesn't really count at all. Instead, your criteria is the right one and mine is "highly problematic". There is no actual proof involved here. There is no genuine "standard of good" that we can agree upon as authoritative and compare with to see who's right. It's simply your opinion of good versus my opinion of good. And yours is right and mine is wrong and therefore God doesn't exist. Now, I'm pretty sure you'd not actually say all of that, but isn't that how it comes out? Unless God aligns with your demands regardless of anyone else's opinion, He simply cannot exist. Do you see how that might be "highly problematic" for me ... you know, to consider changing my worldview for?
"But here's what you're asking. You are asking why God couldn't make another being who knew what He knows and operated as He operates and understood as He understands. Why, after all, couldn't God make, well, other gods? That, you're quite sure, would have been the best of all possible worlds."
You take the trouble to rephrase my question, but you don't see fit to answer it. I'm not suggesting that God needs make other gods; though the parallel to the idea of heaven is no doubt not lost on you. Presumably, you don't believe that (assuming you are in fact one of the elect) you'll be a god in heaven. But would you agree that you'll be much godlier than you currently are, yes? The general idea is that you'll be perfect (though, to be sure, you will still not be a god).
The nature of omnipotence is such that a god could do away with suffering altogether and take not the slightest thig away from whatever goals were intended for the world (excepting, obviously, goals that intentionally cause suffering). So far, it's not the omnipotence or omniscience of the biblical god that is on trial, it's his goodness (though the loss of any one of those attributes is sufficient for my ends).
"There is no actual proof involved here."
You mean, other than the existence of suffering and attendant impossibility of an omnimax god, and besides the impossibility of appealing to a morality more fundamental than one's own?
"I posit that the world as we know it is the world God intended it to be. He didn't do it for humans."
For an omniscient and omnipotent creator, everything (else) is the way it is because of his desire. If humans suffer, it is because he wanted it that way. Whatever the ultimate reason for creation, human suffering was self-evidently one of the goals (or it wouldn't happen). There is no such thing as an undesired side-effect for an omniscient and omnipotent creator. But previously, you've said:
"The suggestion you are making is that if the God of the Bible exists, He either enjoys the suffering of His creatures or He doesn't care. I need to point out that the Bible (remember, we're talking about "the God of the Bible") specifically denies this (e.g., Ezek 33:11)."
If God "didn't do it for humans", this implies that the suffering he knew (via omniscience) would ensue for humans was an undesired side effect of whatever he wanted to do more. This particular problem implies that God is not omnipotent. He doesn't have the power to both prevent suffering (which you say he doesn't enjoy) and achieve his mysterious goal.
" I believe that God knew that sin would result and intended for it to happen.
...
The human has an inflated ego that makes it "all about us", but it's not. Humans, instead, have earned death"
You've just claimed that God intended there to be sin in the world, but the juxtaposition with this talk of 'earning' has God bizarrely punishing his creations for being exactly as he intended them to be. The whole 'throw-away' people issue seems to be growing wildly out of control.
You've decided that suffering has no purpose. I don't actually imagine that it will make a difference, but I have to differ. As an example, a neighbor of mine almost died from a heart attack. The result of his painful near-death experience was a deep appreciation for life. A family I know lost a child in an accident. Their outcome was to much more highly prize the children they still had. In my life, every advance I've made has come through tough times. There is a qualitative difference between knowing something (like the value of life) and knowing it experientially. There is certainly a qualitative difference between the haves and the earned-through-hard-work. I do not believe that humans would have been better served living in a world without any pain.
I'm sorry I appear to have failed to answer your question about God making gods, even though you seem to know exactly what my answer would be -- No. Will I be better in heaven than here? Yes (though not a god), but part of what will make me better in heaven than here will have exactly been the experiences of here. According to the Bible, the experience of being human includes information that the original race that God made who are to this day without sin -- the angels who have retained their state -- cannot comprehend. There is a difference between knowing and experiencing. So if it was God's goal that His creation would experience suffering and the gains such suffering brings, then it would seem that your argument falls on its face, doesn't it? No, it's not God's goodness that is on trial. It is your perception of His goodness. I see no problem with His goodness and you do and my perception doesn't count. Suffering proves the evil of God to you. Suffering does no such thing for me. That suffering exists is proof to you and hardly qualifies as evidence for your argument for me. You say, "Suffering is proof that God is evil" and I say it doesn't even come close.
I have argued that God's ultimate concern is not human beings, but that doesn't mean that He doesn't care about human beings. You're suggesting that because God doesn't enjoy the death of the wicked that He has somehow failed. I can only imagine that you're not a parent. I have seen times with my kids that I've had to let them do things that hurt them -- things I didn't enjoy allowing -- that made them better people. It was not a failure on my part. It wasn't pleasant, but it was in their best interest. I would imagine that God would do a better job at that than I.
I was thinking on my way home from work about your "capricious" sufferer, Job. We could debate opinions about whether or not it was capricious, but it seems to me that the best one to ask would be the one that endured it. What was Job's response? He argued with his wife, "Shall we indeed accept good from God and not accept adversity?" because he understood. Contending with his friends he said, "Though He slay me, I will hope in Him." But he was pushed to the limit. He rose up and demanded an audience with God. He accused God of being unfair. And God answered. Except God didn't answer the accusation. God simply (yeah, right, "simply") asked Job, "Where were you when I created everything?" Halfway through this Grand Inquisition, Job raised his hand. He didn't say, "Look, God, you're not answering the question. All this is well and good, but it's still not fair." No, his response was, "I lay my hand on my mouth." More imporantly, when it was all over, here's Job's conclusion: "I have heard of You by the hearing of the ear; But now my eye sees You." Argue all you want about the evils of suffering. Deny the goodness of God to your heart's content. When people like Job go through intense suffering that some would call "capricious", "gratuitous", or "non-redemptive" and come out the other side better off in their own view, it makes it impossible for me to argue that suffering is, by definition, evil. And that's just looking at it from the view of the benefit to humans.
Stan,
You assert that God can do anything logically possible, though your responses indicate that you don't actually mean it. It looks like you're not even trying to understand the critique; thinking you've answered it.
See ya around.
Cobalt,
I understand your frustration. You don't think I've addressed your arguments. I'm pretty sure you haven't addressed mine. I get it.
Here's the bottom line problem. You've suggested that if God exists, He's evil because He failed to produce "the best of all possible worlds". This BPW concept is a no-win supposition. Why? Because the measure of such a world is your subjective standards. You imagine, for instance, the best of all possible worlds that has no suffering in it. I offered reasons why suffering might be considered of value, but you didn't even respond to them. That's fine. I'm not accusing you of anything. But the arbitrary standard that you've set up is "no suffering". But Bob (an imaginary participant in this conversation) says, "I can imagine a better world without suffering and without work." And Ted (another such participant) says, "Well, if a world of happy people is better, why not a world of more happy people?" "Oh, no," Fred objects, "the world can only sustain so many people." Ted counters with "You're not understanding 'omnipotence', Fred." And so it goes. Regardless of "the best possible world" we can imagine, there will always be a better version, a contradiction of the term "best". The reason there will always be a better version is that all the standards used are subjective, personal standards. And not one of them -- yours or Bob's or Ted's or Freds or whomever -- have more right to being correct than any other because they're all personal, subjective, non-binding standards. So if God is deemed evil because He fails to meet the personal, subjective, non-binding standards of His creation, then God cannot win.
I've replied that by my standards this is the best of all possible worlds. I've answered that the problem is that the objection is premised on the supreme value of humans, a faulty premise by my perspective. I don't see anything illogical about it. But you're quite sure that I do and I'm just not addressing it. That's your choice. I get it. But in the final analysis the truth is not that I haven't responded or even that I haven't examined the questions, but that I simply disagree with your standards of what is best. Somehow that makes me illogical.
I think the point of "Unforgiven" was missed. Earlier in the film, one outlaw says "he had it coming", Eastwood replies "we all have it coming". Also, no one could figure out why Munny's wife would have married (and saved) a man of such low moral character; this is an allusion to unmerited grace...
doncarp14, you are certainly free to see a fine allusion to grace in "Unforgiven" (a movie I didn't like for other reasons than who shot who and why). Doesn't change the fact that we all tend to think we all have something better coming than God's wrath.
Post a Comment